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Abstract—We use a unique proprietary panel data set from a large hotel
company to study how organizational form affects hotel pricing and per-
formance. Aggregate data patterns suggest sizable performance differ-
ences between franchised and company-operated hotels. However, after
controlling for other factors, we find that if significant at all, such differ-
ences are economically small. Moreover, once we endogenize the choice
of organizational form, the differences become insignificant. We conclude
that the company chooses which hotels to franchise and operate corpo-
rately such that, conditional on hotel and market characteristics, it obtains
consistent outcomes across organizational forms.
I. Introduction
HOW firms organize their transactions and how thisaffects their performance are central issues in econom-
ics. A number of theoretical approaches have been used to
explain when and where we should expect different organi-
zational forms to be used. Empirical research in this area
has established a strong link between transaction char-
acteristics and the likelihood that a transaction is organized
in house or not (the make-or-buy decision) and between
transaction characteristics and the terms of contractual
agreements used to manage those that are not brought in
house.1
Much less is known, however, about the effect of organi-
zational form decisions on outcomes. This may seem sur-
prising given the fundamental interest in establishing the
value of using various organizational alternatives. Indeed,
Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) argue that what mat-
ters at the end of the day are differences in behavior or per-
formance: Do vertically integrated firms, or firms that rely
on particular contractual arrangements or contract terms
with their suppliers or retailers, behave differently or per-
form better or worse than those that do not? And if not,
why not? These questions are particularly important given
that whatever affects firm performance ultimately also
determines a firm’s long-term competitiveness and survi-
val.2
Empirical studies of the effects of organizational form
are rare for a reason, however. Fundamentally, the effects
of organizational form or contractual decisions are difficult
to identify empirically given that firms do not make such
choices randomly. In particular, parties choose various
options based on what they expect will give the best out-
come in a given situation.3 This optimizing behavior is, of
course, exactly what the literature on organizational form
decisions relies on and captures. Unfortunately, it also
raises important endogeneity issues when it comes to asses-
sing the effects of organizational form or contractual prac-
tices on outcomes. In fact, the presence of performance dif-
ferences across transactions organized differently in
settings where firms can freely choose how they organize
their transactions leads to a conundrum: If one organiza-
tional form would systematically outperform the other, why
should a firm use any other? If a firm persistently chooses
different organizational forms across its transactions, it
must be because different circumstances call for different
such decisions, as the empirical literature on the choice of
organizational form has demonstrated. These different orga-
nizational form decisions, however, should not lead to
differences in outcomes that could damage the brand; other-
wise, the firm would organize its transactions differently.
This suggests that outcomes that the firm cares about should
be similar, in the end, across organizational forms; other-
wise, the firm would have incentives to adjust its organiza-
tional form decisions.
This paper relies on a unique proprietary panel data set
on the operations of a large hotel firm to study the effect of
vertical integration decisions on the performance of indivi-
dual hotels. The company, whose identity we cannot reveal
for confidentiality reasons, operates several hotel chains in
numerous countries around the world.4 Our data are about
the 1,194 hotels that the company has established in a single
country. Our information on these is quite detailed, includ-Received for publication July 9, 2010. Revision accepted for publication
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ing monthly hotel-level information on price, as well as
standard industry performance metrics: occupancy rates and
revenues per available room (RevPar) over a period of 34
months. We also know whether the hotel is franchised or ver-
tically integrated, as well as individual hotel size, age, and
many other hotel characteristics. We also have data on the
characteristics of the local markets in which each hotel oper-
ates. We can therefore control for many hotel and market
characteristics that are expected to affect hotel-level pricing
decisions and performance. In particular, while we do not
have profit data—and would worry about using these if we
did, for reasons we describe later—we can control for brand
and hotel amenities that affect costs. Moreover, the panel
nature of our data allows us to control for hotel-level unob-
served correlated heterogeneity and thus correct for the tradi-
tional self-selection bias in this type of study, or the possibi-
lity that unobserved hotel characteristics (or ‘‘hotel fixed
effects’’), such as the quality of hotel management, or unob-
served market characteristics may affect both the use of a
particular contractual arrangement and observed outcomes.
Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, or hotel fixed
effects, however, does not resolve the identification issue if
factors that affect organizational form and outcomes can
change over time within hotels. Unfortunately, this is likely
the case as managers often react to changes in the environ-
ment by modifying several things at once, including perhaps
unobserved (by the econometrician) characteristics of a
business and the terms of contracts under which it operates.
Identifying the effect of organizational form then requires
an instrumental variable approach. As Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) noted, valid instruments have been particularly diffi-
cult to find in this literature; it is rare that a variable that is
expected to affect the likelihood that a contract term is used
will not also affect performance directly. Fortunately, we
have data on all of the company’s operations across its sev-
eral brands. We can therefore use the decisions that the com-
pany has made, in terms of organizational form, for all its
other hotels in the local market as an instrument for organi-
zational form at a focal hotel. The organizational form that
the company chooses for its other hotels in the same market
is an ideal instrument as it reflects (to us) unobserved com-
pany cost associated with using a particular governance
form for a focal hotel, and hence the decision to franchise or
operate a particular hotel corporately. Yet for reasons we
elaborate on below, it is not expected to have an impact on
the individual hotel’s behavior or performance directly.
We find that comparing unconditional average outcomes
between franchised and corporate hotels reveals economic-
ally sizable and statistically significant differences, in the
form of lower occupancy rates and higher prices in fran-
chised than in corporate-run hotels. Once we control for
hotel and market characteristics in regression analyses, as
indeed we should, we find lower revenues per available
room (RevPar) and lower prices in franchised compared to
corporate hotels. More important, and consistent with
results obtained in the literature when authors have tried to
control for similar factors in their analyses (Shepard, 1993;
Bloom, Kretschmer, & Van Reenen, 2011), these differ-
ences become quite small compared to the effects of other
hotel or market characteristics, such as presence, or not, of
air conditioning and tourism intensity. Finally, these perfor-
mance differences become both economically and statisti-
cally insignificant when we endogenize the choice of orga-
nizational form.
These results, which are robust across our numerous spe-
cifications, imply that the company chooses which hotels to
franchise and which to own in a way that yields no differ-
ence in the end in either pricing or performance between
the two sets of hotels. These findings contrast with those of
studies where differences in organizational forms were
mandated by government policy. In such studies, authors
found important differences in performance across organi-
zational forms. Our results suggest instead that these differ-
ences should be attributed to the requirement that the firm
use an organizational form it would not have chosen—one
that is suboptimal under the circumstances—rather than to
the imposed organizational form itself. Our results are
important, then, because they imply that when firms’ gov-
ernance choices are unrestricted, they can make these deci-
sions in a way that yields similar outcomes across govern-
ance forms. In that sense, our findings explain the persistent
coexistence of different organizational forms while con-
firming the conjecture of transaction cost economics that
differences in outcomes due to organizational form per se
should erode over time.5 Our results, moreover, confirm
that firms can effectively use their choice of organizational
form to adjust to various market and outlet-level differences
such that, in the end, their outlets need not perform differ-
ently. In other words, our findings confirm the important
role of organizational form decisions for firm performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
briefly review the relevant literature and discuss the funda-
mental differences between franchising and corporate own-
ership and their potential implications for pricing and per-
formance outcomes. We then explain the fundamental
problem of selection that complicates analyses of the per-
formance effects of organizational form. In section III, we
describe our data and present some preliminary evidence.
We discuss our empirical methodology and results in sec-
tion IV, and conclude in section V.
II. Organizational Form and Performance
A. Brief Overview of the Literature
Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) note that although
the theoretical literature is replete with models characteriz-
ing how and why firm boundaries should matter for firm
5 See Yvrande-Billon and Saussier (2005) for a discussion of dynamic
implications of transaction cost economics that implies that such differ-
ences should disappear over time as firms fail, or reorganize, or modify
their transactions.
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behavior and performance, little attention has been given to
assessing the consequences of integration decisions em-
pirically. To our knowledge, Shelton (1967) was the first to
address this question. He did so by measuring the effect
of switching from franchising to company ownership, and
from company ownership back to franchising, on outlet
costs, revenues, and profits in a single franchise chain. He
found no tendency for revenues to differ across the two
governance regimes, but under company ownership, costs
were higher, and thus profits were lower, than under fran-
chising.
The main advantage of Shelton’s study was its within-
outlet design, which held outlet and market characteristics
constant as the mode of organization changed. Its main
drawback, however, was that outlets in the chain he studied
were operated under company ownership only during transi-
tion periods. In other words, franchising was the preferred
mode of organization, and company ownership was only a
transitory phase at any given outlet. It is not so surprising,
under these circumstances, that company ownership turned
out to be a low-performance (high-cost) organizational
form. Also, Shelton relied on accounting cost and profit data
that, unfortunately, are especially problematic in the context
of franchising. Specifically, as independent business owners,
franchisees can make accounting decisions to benefit
them—for example, from a tax perspective.6 That reported
profits and costs can be manipulated by franchisees is men-
tioned as a main reason that franchisors base their royalty
and advertising fees on revenues. Despite these drawbacks,
Shelton’s analyses and findings were groundbreaking.
Several authors since have looked for differences in firm
performance or behavior across governance forms through
the lenses of ‘‘natural experiments’’ arising from changes in
regulatory regimes. The most famous of these has been the
case of gasoline retailing regulation. Divorcement laws,
which have been passed by a number of state legislatures,
usually occur as a result of lobbying on the part of fran-
chised dealers who claim that when a company acts as both
supplier and horizontal competitor, its behavior is influ-
enced by considerations related to downstream competition
and foreclosure. They argue that prohibiting company
operations will increase competition and yield better out-
comes for consumers. The empirical literature (Barron &
Umbeck, 1984; Vita, 2000; Blass & Carlton, 2001) instead
has found that prices are higher when oil companies are
prevented from operating stations directly. Similarly, in his
study of the effect of state laws protecting the territories of
car retailers, Smith (1982) found that car prices and dealer-
ship values rose, while hours of operation fell, after the
state laws were enacted. Finally, Slade (1998) examines the
forced move that occurred in the U.K. beer industry from
franchising with two-part tariffs to market interaction under
linear prices. She finds that draft beer prices rose after
brewers were prevented from charging fixed fees.7
A related but different literature finds differences in per-
formance between vertical integration and separation in
contexts where firms are constrained by labor unions to
limit the extent of integration (Forbes & Lederman, 2010,
on airlines) or to continue to operate corporate outlets
(Arrun˜ada, Va´zquez, & Zanarone, 2009, on car dealerships
in Spain).
Though limited, the empirical evidence has been consis-
tent in suggesting that differences in organizational form
lead to differences in performance. That is, when firms are
required to use an organizational form other than the one
they would have chosen if policy were not in place, authors
find differences in prices and other observed outcomes at
the outlet level.
Our interest, however, lies in determining whether differ-
ences in prices and performance outcomes arise ‘‘in equili-
brium’’ when firms are free to choose the ways in which they
organize their transactions. The reason this is important is
that a mandated organizational form, or an organizational
form used during a transition period only, as in Shelton’s
study, is by definition suboptimal since the firm’s preferred
option is either unfeasible or prohibited. In other words, the
policy changes considered in the literature not only affect
the costs and benefits of decision makers’ options, as would
be typical in the ‘‘treatment effect’’ literature, but rather
dictated their final choices (as did divorcement laws or
labor unions). Analyses based on such policies clearly allow
authors to identify the costs of mandating specific organiza-
tional form changes. But this is not the same as identifying
the effects of organizational form choices on performance in
the ‘‘unconstrained’’ context—when the firm still might
have made a different choice—as the differences in out-
comes in the constrained case can be attributed simply to the
inefficiency of the mandated organizational form.
To address the question of whether differences in out-
comes should arise due to organizational form per se, that
is, when firms can choose and adjust governance form
freely, we follow Shelton, and a few other studies that we
mention below, and conduct our analyses in the context of
franchising. An important advantage of this setting is that
most franchisors (70% to 75%) choose to operate at least
some of their outlets corporately while franchising the
others.8 The company whose data we rely on indeed main-
tains both types of operations over time within each of its
6 In its 2003 Uniform Franchise Offering Circular, among a series of
caveats relating to cost estimation from franchised store data, McDo-
nald’s (2003) states that ‘‘organization overhead costs, such as salaries
and benefits of non-restaurant personnel (if any), cost of an automobile
used in the business (if any) and other discretionary expenditures may sig-
nificantly affect profits realized in any given operation.’’ See also Maness
(1996) on this issue.
7 See also Gil (2010), who shows a statistically significant decrease in
the number of movies produced by main studios and their share of the
market in the aftermath of the Paramount case. Gil attributes this effect to
the prohibition of block booking that accompanied the requirement that
major studios divest their exhibition assets.
8 See Blair and Lafontaine (2005) for data on corporate outlets in
mature franchised chains.
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chains, and, contrary to Shelton, it does so purposely rather
than using one of them only during transition periods. In this
setting, we can examine whether pricing decisions and other
outcomes differ between the company-operated and fran-
chised outlets of the same chain within the same company,
thus holding constant many chain- and firm-level policies
and related variables that might affect outcomes. In addition,
we can avoid self-selection bias—issues surrounding the
decision of which hotels are franchised and which are corpo-
rate—by controlling explicitly for many hotel and market
characteristics, as well as hotel-level unobserved correlated
heterogeneity. Finally, we address remaining potential iden-
tification issues using an instrumental variable approach that
we describe further below. But first we discuss the funda-
mental differences between franchised and corporate outlets
and their potential implications for pricing and performance
outcomes, as well as the results of the few studies since Shel-
ton (1967) that have examined these issues empirically.
B. Franchising versus Company Operation
As is well known, the incentives of hired managers and
franchisees, and their objectives, can be very different,
potentially leading them to put forth different levels of
effort that could affect outcomes.9 Theories yield different
predictions, however, as to the form of pricing and other
outcome differences depending on the behavior or outcome
of interest and the specifics of the incentive problem that
the theory emphasizes.
The traditional principal-agent model, with its emphasis
on the higher-powered incentives of franchisees, suggests
that demand will be higher, and average variable costs
lower, in franchised than in corporate outlets. On the other
hand, a franchisee’s ownership of his outlet may lead him
to free ride on the value of the brand. This could lead to
lower quality levels and thus lower demand, and/or higher
prices, in franchised outlets.10 In other words, economic
theory leads to different predictions depending on whether
the outcome of interest is most affected by the basic incen-
tive issue (too little effort) that is solved by having a fran-
chisee own his outlet, according to the traditional agency
model, or by the fact that profit-maximizing franchisees
who own their outlet can increase their individual profits
through free riding.11
Price has been the outcome variable that has attracted the
most attention in the empirical literature, however. This is
because many theoretical arguments imply that prices
should be higher in franchised outlets.12 First, contracts
written with franchisees are typically more complex and
thus costlier to write and enforce than those written with
employee managers, and this might increase costs and prices
more generally in franchised outlets. Second, if an establish-
ment has market power and the franchise contract involves
royalty payments, double marginalization might lead to
higher prices in franchised than in corporate hotels. Third,
the presence of positive spillovers can result in franchisees’
choosing prices above those that maximize the chain’s prof-
its (prices that would be set in corporate outlets). Finally, a
franchisee who successfully increases demand at his hotel
through higher effort might also price higher as a result.
While these arguments imply there should be differences
in prices between the two organizational forms, it is also
true that depending on the regulatory environment and their
preferences, franchisors may be able and choose to impose
pricing restraints on franchisees to induce similar prices in
both corporate and franchised outlets.13 Alternatively, if
franchisors are unhappy with the pricing decisions of their
franchisees, they can buy back and directly operate outlets
whose prices are out of line with their preferences and in
that way make prices more similar across the two sets of
outlets.
Shepard (1993), Hastings (2004) and Hosken, McMillan,
and Taylor (2008) have examined how price differs between
gasoline stations that are franchised versus those that are
operated directly by oil companies in contexts where the
companies were not constrained to choose one form of orga-
nization or another. While Shepard (1993) found the prices
of some products to be somewhat higher in franchised gaso-
line stations, Hastings (2004) found no such difference, and
Hosken et al. (2008) concluded that prices were higher in
company-operated stations.
Rather than examining differences in prices, a few
authors have looked for evidence of quality differences
between the two types of outlets. Bradach (1998, p. 109)
interviewed managers in five fast food chains and found
that managers ‘‘agreed that the two arrangements exhibited
similar levels of [standard adherence] uniformity.’’ For the
two firms in his sample that used third-party evaluators to
assess quality, the average score was 94.6 (out of 100
points) for the franchised and 93.9 for the corporate outlets
in the first chain and 89.7 and 90.6, respectively, for the
9 See Brickley and Dark (1987), Lafontaine (1992), Bradach (1998),
and Blair and Lafontaine (2005), and references therein.
10 Franchisees also sometimes argue that their franchisor behaves
opportunistically toward them. In the hotel industry, one version of this
argument is that lodging companies favor corporate hotels when tourist
agencies or groups make reservations. Everything else the same, this
would lead to higher occupancy rates in corporate hotels.
11 See, for example, Brickley and Dark (1987), Manolis, Dahlstrom,
and Nygaard (1995), Brickley (1999), Lafontaine and Raynaud (2002),
and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) on free riding and how it affects organi-
zational form decisions in franchised chains.
12 There is also a sizable literature in management on differential survi-
val rates between franchised and company-operated or individually
owned businesses. Blair and Lafontaine (2005) provide an overview of
these issues.
13 Most of the studies of pricing differentials in franchised businesses in
the United States have been carried out at a time when vertical price
restraints were treated as ‘‘per se’’ violations of antitrust laws. In our data,
the high variation in prices (see the online data appendix) and significant
differences between average prices of franchised and corporate hotels
(table 3) confirm that the company was not imposing a requirement of
consistent prices across properties. See Blair and Lafontaine (2005) for
more on this issue.
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other. He concluded that there was no quality difference
between the two types of outlets. Using data on quality rat-
ings published by Consumer Reports, Michael (2000) found
that quality was negatively associated with franchising in
both the restaurant and hotel industries and concluded that
free riding was a problem for franchised chains. Finally,
Jin and Leslie (2009) found evidence that hygiene scores
(a measure of quality) were higher among the corporate
than the franchised restaurants of the same chains in their
data.
In sum, the evidence on the question of whether there are
differences in outcomes between the two types of outlets
remains mixed, especially in contexts where a firm’s choice
of organizational form is ‘‘unconstrained.’’ To shed more
light on this issue, we explore whether differences in orga-
nizational form lead to differences in the three standard out-
come variables used in the hotel industry: prices, occupancy
rates, and revenues per available room (RevPar).
III. The Data
We rely on two complementary data sources in this
paper. The first is a confidential data set provided by the
company, a large hotel firm with extensive operations
worldwide. The data set includes monthly data on occu-
pancy rates, average room price, and total revenues for all
the company’s hotels in a single country. The data cover
the period from January 2001 to October 2003, for a total of
34 observations for most of the 1,194 hotels in the data. In
fact, the average number of observations per hotel in our
sample is 32, so our panel data is quite balanced.14 All the
hotels in the data are operated under one of six brands, with
each brand belonging to a quality tier from budget to lux-
ury.15 For each hotel, we know whether it is operated by
the franchisor or belongs to a franchisee, and, in the latter
case, who the franchisee is.16 A third form of organization
used in this industry is also present here: a few hotels
are operated under management contracts (Kehoe, 1996;
Lafontaine, Perrigot, & Wilson, 2013). In these cases, a
third party (usually a local investor/developer) owns the
physical property, but the company hires managers to oper-
ate the hotel under its brand name. Given the company’s
full management control and the fact that we have just a
few such hotels in the data (48 of them, or 4% of our data),
we treat them as company-operated hotels (that is, corpo-
rate hotels). Our results are robust to excluding these from
our analyses.
The data also contain information about hotel location.
From this, we can measure the distance of the hotel from
the company’s headquarters and calculate the number of
hotels of the company across all its brands in a market
(Hotel Density).17 The geographic market definition we rely
on is an administrative unit, defined by the government and
characterized by separate jurisdiction or institutions, which
in terms of size is about the same as or smaller than a U.S.
county. This allows us to capture fine-grained variation in
economic and institutional factors across markets (as dis-
cussed further below) that could otherwise bias our esti-
mates. Our company operates hotels across 582 such mar-
kets. The distribution of the company’s hotels across these
582 markets is highly skewed; in 88% of the markets, there
are only 1 to 3 hotels affiliated with the company. But
because a few markets are quite large, as table 1 shows, on
average a hotel in our data operates in a market with about
9 other hotels belonging to our company and about 22
hotels in total. Similarly, the distribution of hotels operated
by other firms is also skewed: about 50% of the markets in
our data have fewer than 5 hotels belonging to other firms
than our company.18 Further, since we know the date at
which each hotel our data began its operations or became
part of the company’s hotels, we can calculate the propor-
tion of the company’s other hotels in the same market as
hotel i (sum over all brands) that are franchised. We use this
variable as our main instrument in our analyses and discuss
it further in sections IVA and IVC.
We know the brand under which each hotel operates,
hotel age and size (in number of rooms), and other hotel
characteristics, including hotel amenities—for example,
whether the hotel offers air-conditioned rooms, a fitness
facility, a pool, a restaurant, an outdoor cafe´, and so on—as
well as specifics of hotel location, in particular whether a
hotel is near an airport or a train station (see the online data
appendix for more details). We include all these as control
variables in our empirical specifications. Since brands, and
the associated customer services, together with hotel ame-
nities, are the major sources of cost differences in the hotel
industry, we believe that including brand and amenity fixed
effects reliably controls for underlying cost differences
among hotels.
To control for local market characteristics, we use gov-
ernment data on population (in 1999), median household
income (in 2000), and tourism intensity (in 1998). The tour-
ism intensity data take the form of a monthly indicator, on a
14 As we discuss in section IVC, our results are robust to excluding the
few hotels with shorter time series.
15 At the time we obtained the data, the company operated 1,305 hotels
across seven brands. One of its smaller brands (36 hotels), however, was
fully corporate. We eliminated these hotels from our analyses due to per-
fect failure determination in our first-stage regressions. After this and
removing a few hotels with missing data, our final data set includes infor-
mation on 1,194 hotels across six brands. When measuring variables relat-
ing to ‘‘other hotels of the company,’’ however, we use the information
for all 1,305 hotels.
16 We know only who owns each hotel at the end of our data period so
we can identify multi-outlet ownership only on this basis. See section IVC
for more on this.
17 We count the company’s hotels and define related variables using the
1,305 hotels of the company in our raw data.
18 Freedman and Kosova´ (2012) also find that ‘‘about 82% of the . . .
counties in the U.S. have at least one hotel each year during 1993–2006.
However, the distribution of hotels across counties is highly skewed.
Among counties with at least one hotel, the average number of hotels per
county (14.6) is roughly three times the median number of hotels per
county (five).’’
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scale of 0 (none) to 4 (very high), over the full calendar
year for each local market.19 Having access to monthly
variation in tourism intensity is a big advantage when ana-
lyzing the hotel sector, since it allows us to control for sea-
sonality in local demand as well as unobserved tourist desti-
nation effects that could potentially vary from month to
month. We include this information using a series of
dummy variables—one for each level of tourism intensity.
To further control for market-level specific effects, differ-
ences in local industry structure, and the intensity of com-
petition, we use government data on the total number of
hotels (not only the company’s) in each market as of 1998
to construct hotel competition dummy variables. We also
use data on the total number of restaurants in each market
to construct a set of restaurant competition dummy vari-
ables. Since restaurants may compete with hotels for custo-
mer expenditure dollars and for the same labor resources,
we view them as complementary goods that may also affect
hotel revenues.20
Performance in the hotel industry is typically measured
in terms of occupancy rate or, more often, in terms of
RevPar (revenue per available room), the key financial
measure for the industry, according to the PKF Hospitality
Research Company.21 Unlike room price (average daily
rate), RevPar also captures the level of occupied capacity: it
amounts to price multiplied by average occupancy rate for
the month, and as such represents a measure of yield.22 In
our analyses, we consider all three dependent variables:
occupancy rates, RevPar, and price.
We show descriptive statistics for all the variables in
table 1, where we treat each hotel as a single observation.
Since we have an almost balanced panel, the descriptive
statistics are basically the same if we use hotel-months as
our unit of observation.
Table 2 shows the same information for different hotel
brands. For confidentiality reasons, we grouped the com-
pany’s six brands into five brand groups, that is, we com-
bine the hotels operating under two similar brands in one of
our five brand groups. Since the different brands represent
different quality tiers, from luxury to budget, with corre-
spondingly different prices, we show the five brand groups
ranked by average prices, from highest to lowest. This table
highlights the important differences in the levels of many of
our variables, including the extent of franchising, across the
company’s hotel brand groups. This indicates that we must
control for brand-specific effects in our empirical model if
we are to identify performance differences between fran-
chised and company-operated hotels.
Given our interest in performance differences between the
two organizational forms, table 3 compares franchised and
TABLE 1—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, BY HOTEL
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Price (room rate)a 53.67 31.45 20.38 292.54
RevPara 37.23 21.73 10.51 196.79
Occupancy rate (%) 70.43 10.94 32.25 101.39
Revenues/month (000s)a 172.31 251.47 20.15 3,118.99
Number of rooms 91.24 67.35 29.94 782
Hotel age 13.41 8.37 1 73.94
Other hotels in marketb 22.19 33.19 0 266
Tourism intensity 1.71 1.08 0 4
Population 193,383 498,502 192 2,125,851
Incomea 9,993.03 2,110.97 4,161.71 23,021.63
Franchised 0.34 0.47 0 1
Restaurant on site 0.44 0.50 0 1
Outdoor cafe´ 0.27 0.44 0 1
Air conditioning 0.47 0.50 0 1
Fitness facility 0.05 0.23 0 1
Proportion of company’s other hotels in
local market that are franchisedc
0.17 0.22 0 0.80
Distance from headquarters 300.55 221.32 0 917.18
Total number of company’s hotels in
local market (hotel density)c
9.37 22.71 1 99
a In euros.
b This information is available only for 1,015 of the 1,194 hotels in our data. The other hotels operate in very large cities, and the government data do not contain this type of variable for very large markets.
c Company hotel counts are based on the company’s full set of hotels (1,305) in the raw data.
19 These data were obtained through surveys of local officials and repre-
sent local assessment of how desirable each locality is from a tourism per-
spective at different months in the calendar year.
20 We use these different sets of dummy variables rather than more tra-
ditional geography-based dummy variables as controls for market and
location fixed effects in part because we have so few hotels in many local
markets. As a result, market-specific effects cannot be identified sepa-
rately from hotel-specific effects. More important we believe that group-
ing hotel locations according to the level of competition among hotels,
and among restaurants, and including information about time-varying
tourism intensity and specific characteristics of hotel location (see above),




22 Alternatively, RevPar is hotel monthly revenues divided by the num-
ber of room-days offered by the hotel that month (the size of the hotel
times the number of days in the month). As we cannot reveal the com-
pany’s name or country but want to provide some information on the
magnitude of the transactions, we have transformed all the financial vari-
ables into euros.
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corporately run hotels. The results show that price is higher
on average among franchised hotels, while occupancy rates
are lower. Both differences are statistically significant but of
opposite signs, such that in the end, revenue per available
room (RevPar) is the same across the two groups.
The data also show that corporate hotels are much larger
(and older) on average. Given no statistical difference in
RevPar, it is probably the larger size of corporate hotels that
explains the significant difference in total monthly revenues
between the two groups. Consistent with the literature on
factors that drive the decision to franchise, table 3 also sug-
gests that on average, franchised hotels are located farther
away from headquarters and operate in markets where the
company also franchises a larger proportion of its hotels (see
Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004, on the clustering of franchised
and of corporate outlets in franchised chains). The demo-
graphic characteristics of the markets—income and popula-
tion—are not significantly different between the two sets of
hotels, however. And contrary to what one might expect
from a monitoring perspective, franchised hotels operate in
markets where the company has larger numbers of hotels.
Finally, compared to corporate properties, franchised hotels
are more likely to offer amenities such as outdoor cafe´s or air
conditioning but less likely to offer fitness facilities. The last
two patterns are likely driven by the large number of corpo-
rate hotels in groups 4 and 5, which are the lowest-priced
hotels with almost no amenities, located in markets where
the company and other hoteliers operate few hotels.
Though these aggregate data patterns suggest differences
in pricing and performance between the two organizational
forms, unconditional mean comparisons such as these can
be misleading since they do not take into account the poten-
tial impact of market or other hotel factors and unobserved
hotel heterogeneity that can also lead to different perfor-
mance levels. The differences in other variables beside our
performance measures between the two sets of hotels, as
well as differences across brands, clearly show that we need
to control for all these other variables, and for brand effects,
to correctly identify performance differences due to organi-
zational form per se. We therefore turn to regression ana-
TABLE 2—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PER BRAND GROUP AND HOTEL; MEANS (SD)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Number of hotelsb 152 236 331 193 284
% franchised 15.33 50.47 51.69 45.45 2.8
(0.36) (50.01) (49.76) (49.78) (15.90)
Price (Room Rate)a 98.99 77.39 54.10 32.91 23.40
(42.77) (19.30) (8.73) (4.15) (1.70)
RevPara 64.82 49.47 39.65 24.89 17.82
(32.19) (17.86) (10.29) (5.45) (3.07)
Occupancy rate (%) 64.09 62.23 72.02 74.95 75.55
(9.02) (9.88) (9.42) (11.02) (8.85)
Revenues/month (000s)a 487.47 233.24 153.93 67.37 46.51
(470.77) (191.92) (172.03) (60.61) (32.11)
Number of rooms 140.45 96.63 88.53 75.96 74.17
(105.95) (61.27) (70.39) (48.59) (29.83)
Hotel age 21.81 13.10 14.93 5.7 12.67
(10.77) (9.62) (7.05) (3.87) (2.58)
Other hotels in marketc 32.03 34.54 25.68 16.78 8.68
(40.04) (43.48) (32.95) (28.22) (13.22)
Tourism intensity 1.85 1.91 1.88 1.74 1.25
(1.12) (1.06) (1.03) (1.11) (0.99)
Population 303,405 303,613 240,994 102,683 49,352
(625,310) (628,190) (555,206) (320,425) (191,733)
Incomea 10,739 10,305 9,956 9,750 9,544
(2,137) (2,267) (2,073) (2,079) (1,879)
Restaurant on site 0.99 0.68 0.64 0 0
(0.08) (0.47) (0.48)
Outdoor cafe´ 0.11 0.50 0.57 0 0
(0.31) (0.50) (0.50)
Air conditioning 0.91 0.79 0.56 0.30 0
(0.29) (0.41) (0.50) (0.46)
Fitness facility 0.22 0.13 0 0 0
(0.41) (0.34)
Proportion of company’s other hotels
in market franchisedd
0.18 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Distance from headquarters 301.87 311.63 300.02 295.99 294.23
(239.47) (232.48) (211.01) (233.35) (205.11)
Total number of company’s hotels in
Market (hotel density)d
14.42 14.23 11.44 5.24 3.02
(28.48) (28.91) (25.38) (14.11) (8.46)
Brand groups are ordered by average price of room from the highest to lowest. In total we have six brands in our data. For confidentiality reasons we grouped two smaller brands (representing similar hotel-quality
level) into one group.
a In euros.
b The number of hotels across all brands adds to 1,196 rather than 1,194 because 2 hotels changed brand during our sample period. In the above statistics, we include them in both groups.
c This information is available for only 1,015 of the 1,194 hotels in our data. The other hotels operate in very large cities, and the government data do not contain this type of variable for very large markets.
d Company hotel counts are based on the company’s full set of hotels (1,305) in the raw data.
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lyses in the next section, where we exploit both the within-
and between-hotel variation in our data (see figure A1 in
the online data appendix for more details).
IV. Methodology and Results
A. Baseline Specifications and Results
Our goal is to estimate whether franchised hotels differ
in terms of pricing and performance from corporate hotels.
To do so, we estimate an empirical model of the following
general form:
Yit ¼ f ðFit; Xit; Zi; dt; eitÞ;
where i and t index hotel and months (1 through 34),
respectively, and Yit stands for the (log) of our outcome
variable of interest, namely, revenues per available room
(RevPar), price (room rate), or occupancy rate. Fit describes
organizational form, where each hotel in a given month can
either be franchised (Fit ¼1) or company operated (Fit ¼ 0,
the control group). Xit represents time-varying and Zi time-
invariant hotel and market characteristics, including sets of
brand, amenity, and market competition (hotels and also res-
taurants) dummy variables. As implied by the data in tables
2 and 3, it is important to include all these variables; other-
wise our coefficient estimate for the franchise dummy vari-
able would be biased. Moreover, dummy variables indi-
cating the presence of various amenities as well as brand
dummy variables are important as they capture major
sources of cost differences among hotels. Controlling for
these thus allows us to interpret differences in occupancy
rates and in RevPar in terms of bottom-line performance to
some extent. Finally, we control for changes in aggregate
demand over time, as well as changes in company policies
(such as company advertising) and other unobserved shocks
common across all the hotels of the company, by including a
dummy variable dt for each month-year combination in our
data (33 in total).













Occupancy rate (%) 68.31 71.52 ***
(11.51) (10.48)
Revenues/month (000s)a 126.89 195.71 ***
(100.24) (298.46)
Number of rooms 74.24 100 ***
(36.41) (77.26)
Hotel age 10.25 15.04 ***
(7.92) (8.13)
Other hotels in marketb 23.77 21.36
(33.51) (33.01)






Restaurant on site 0.46 0.43
(0.50) (0.50)
Outdoor cafe´ 0.40 0.21 ***
(0.49) (0.41)
Air conditioning 0.60 0.41 ***
(0.49) (0.49)
Fitness facility 0.03 0.06 **
(0.183) (0.244)
Proportion of company’s other
hotels in market franchisedc
0.23 0.14 ***
(0.24) (0.20)
Distance from headquarters 322.06 289.47 **
(221.64) (220.47)
Total number of company hotels
in market (hotel density)c
10.97 8.54 *
(25.96) (20.81)
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
a In euros.
b These data are available only for 1,015 of the hotels in our data, out of which 349 are franchised and 666 are corporately operated. The other hotels operate in very large cities, and the government data do not con-
tain this type of variable for very large markets.
c Company hotel counts are based on the company’s full set of hotels (1,305) in the raw data.
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We assume that eit ¼ mi þ uit is a composite error term,
where mi represents hotel-level unobserved heterogeneity
that for now we treat as being uncorrelated with observed
characteristics, and uit is an idiosyncratic error term. In our
analyses, we control for hotel-level unobserved and uncor-
related heterogeneity (mi) by correcting standard errors for
hotel-level clusters, as well as estimating a random effects
specification (RE).23 Moreover, in all estimations we cor-
rect standard errors for (potential) heteroskedasticity by
using the White/Huber robust estimator of the variance-
covariance matrix. All continuous variables are included in
the regressions in logarithmic form so that the coefficient
estimates represent elasticities. This functional form allows
for nonlinear relationships among variables and reduces the
potential impact of outliers or skewed regressors and thus
yields more robust coefficient estimates.
Consistent with business practice in the hotel industry,
we expect price changes in reaction to realized occupancy
rates in the previous period. Hence, when the dependent
variable is price, we include the lagged value of occupancy
rate (in logs) as an additional control variable. Similarly,
since customers usually reserve rooms in advance or decide
whether to stay in a hotel based on their expectations about
price or hotel quality, all of which are affected by prices
posted at the time of the reservation, we include the lagged
value of price (in logs) as a control variable in occupancy
rate regressions. Empirically these lagged values are prede-
termined (and thus exogenous) variables, as they are known
already when the performance outcome is measured.
We show results from OLS regressions for our three
dependent variables in columns 1, 4, and 7 of table 4. One
potential concern with OLS estimation is that some of the
unobserved hotel heterogeneity (mi), such as the quality of
hotel management or characteristics of the hotel location
(coastal or mountain area, for example) that are not captured
by our control variables, might be correlated with organiza-
tional form. In that case, OLS results would be biased due to
the omission of hotel fixed effects and the traditional self-
selection problem. To address this issue of possibly corre-
lated unobserved hotel heterogeneity (in addition to uncorre-
lated hotel heterogeneity), we follow Mundlak (1978) and
include hotel-level means of time-varying regressors as
additional control variables in our regressions.24 Specifi-
cally, we assume that hotel-level unobserved heterogeneity
(mi) can be written as
li ¼ Xinþ ai;
where Xi is the vector of the hotel-level means of all
time-varying hotel and market characteristics (Xit, t ¼
1,. . .,34).25 In this equation, ai represents that part of hotel
unobserved heterogeneity (in the error term) that is uncorre-
lated with the regressors and that we control for via hotel-
level clusters.
We rely on Mundlak’s approach, rather than standard
fixed-effects estimation, because our dependent variables
show rich within-hotel monthly variation (see the online
appendix) that we want to exploit in our analysis, but our
main variable of interest, organizational form, changes little
over time. In this situation, estimating a standard fixed-
effects model, which amounts to relying on within-hotel
time variation only, would prevent us from identifying
the impact of organizational form.26 Modeling hotel unob-
served correlated heterogeneity as a function of hotel-level
means allows us to introduce some correlation between li
and Xi, and thus obtain consistent estimates of the coeffi-
cients of interest.27
Results from this procedure are also shown in table 4, in
columns 2–3, 5–6, and 8–9. In most cases, they are similar
to our OLS results in columns 1, 4, and 7, but for some vari-
ables, the size or statistical significance of the coefficients
changes, pointing out the importance of controlling for
unobserved correlated heterogeneity.
Results in table 4 are quite consistent when it comes to
differences in outcomes between the two organizational
forms. Though the random effects estimate of the coeffi-
cient for the franchised dummy variable is insignificant in
column 6, the OLS estimates suggest that franchisees
charge lower prices rather than higher ones, as was implied
by our simple descriptive statistics above. Moreover, occu-
pancy rates are similar across franchised and corporate
hotels. The combination of these two effects in turn implies
lower revenues per available room among franchised hotels,
23 The difference between clustering in OLS estimations and a random
effects specification is that the random effects model imposes an equal
correlation structure among hotel observations when deriving the coeffi-
cient estimates through generalized least squares (GLS) estimation. If the
equal correlation structure assumption is correct, the RE model provides
more efficient estimates; if not, then the OLS with clustered standard
errors estimates (which do not rely on any GLS procedure) are more
appropriate. We report results from both specifications in table 4.
24 Mundlak (1978) shows that the results from standard fixed effects
models can be obtained via random effects estimations when firm-level
means of time-varying regressors are added as additional controls. We
include the means not only in random effect specifications but also in
OLS estimations, because, as discussed previously, OLS estimations with
clustered standard errors allow more robust correlation structures among
hotel-level observations.
25 We include the hotel-level means of the following variables: number
of rooms, age, and tourism intensity dummy variables, all of which vary
over time in our data. When the dependent variable is price (or occupancy
rate), we also include the mean of lagged occupancy rate (price). Since
other variables do not vary over time within hotels, their means cannot be
included.
26 Wooldridge (1995, 2002) discusses this methodology in the context
of controlling for correlated unobserved heterogeneity in nonlinear mod-
els (probit/tobit), where data demeaning also does not apply.
27 Note that this approach assumes that observed and unobserved fac-
tors are additively separable. Petrin and Train (2010) develop control
function methods to correct for the endogeneity of prices due to unob-
served factors in discrete choice models. While their methods do not
require the assumption of additive separability, they show that even when
this assumption is rejected, the demand elasticity estimates are very simi-
lar between their control function approach and alternative estimators that
impose this assumption (including the fixed-effects estimator). All of
these estimates, however, differ significantly from the elasticities esti-
mated without any correction for unobservables.
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an implication that is also visible in the first three columns
of table 4.28
While the impact of the franchising dummy variable on
prices and RevPar is negative and statistically significant in
most specifications in table 4, the differences implied by the
estimates are economically quite small, especially compared
to the effect of many hotel or market characteristics. For
instance, the presence of air conditioning at a hotel has three
to four times the effect (in absolute value) on prices, and two
to three times the effect on RevPar, compared to what we find
for whether the hotel is franchised or not. Specifically, while
being franchised reduces RevPar on average by around 4%
and prices by about 2% compared to corporate hotels, offering
air conditioning increases RevPar by about 10% and prices by
6% to 7%. Similarly, the coefficients of the tourism intensity
dummy variables, which increase as one moves from the low-
est intensity (¼ 0, the control group) to very high intensity (¼
4), show that seasonal demand changes have much larger
impacts on all three outcome measures than does organiza-
tional form, especially when controlling for hotel-level corre-
lated heterogeneity. Indeed, whether the hotel experiences
very high (¼ 4) versus almost no (¼ 0) tourism intensity in a
given month generates differences in all three outcomes at
least ten times larger (columns 2–3, 5–6, and 8–9) than those
we find for whether the hotel is franchised or not.
Turning to the effect of lagged occupancy rate in col-
umns 4 to 6, we find, as expected, that hotels increase prices
in a given month when they experience high occupancy
rates in the prior month. These effects are smaller when we
control for hotel-level correlated heterogeneity in columns
5 and 6. Still, a 10% increase in occupancy rate in the last
month, which in our sample corresponds to a 7 percentage
point increase given a mean occupancy rate of 70%, is asso-
ciated with a 0.4% higher price in the current month. Simi-
larly, a high price in the last month is associated with a
sizable increase in current occupancy rate, as shown in col-
umns 7 to 9. In general, the effects of lagged occupancy
rates and prices support our arguments concerning the
importance of past information for both managers and cus-
tomers in this industry.
Finally, we find evidence that older hotels have higher
occupancy rates, and higher RevPar, while larger hotels
have lower occupancy rates and RevPar. In particular, esti-
mated coefficients (elasticities) suggest that increasing hotel
capacity by 1% (which, given the mean size of hotels in our
data, corresponds to an increase of roughly 1 room) reduces
both occupancy rate and RevPar by about 0.27%. Similarly,
increasing hotel age by 10% (about 1.3 years given our
sample mean of 13.4 years) leads to a 2.2% to 2.4%
increase in RevPar and a 1.7% to 1.9% increase in occu-
pancy rate on average. Not surprisingly, hotels offering
more amenities, such as air-conditioning or fitness facilities,
or those in high-population and high-income areas, com-
mand higher prices and obtain higher RevPar.
While the regression analyses control for many observed
hotel and market characteristics, as well as unobserved
hotel characteristics, it remains that our approach may not
control for all potential sources of correlation between the
idiosyncratic shock (uit) and organizational form. In parti-
cular, it is possible that hotel-specific demand or supply
shocks (such as a hotel going through major remodeling)
that we do not observe in the data and changes over time in
unobserved hotel-level characteristics (such as changes in
management personnel) will be correlated with both perfor-
mance and organizational form, thereby still biasing our
coefficients of interest.29 For this reason, in table 5, we pre-
sent results obtained when we endogenize organizational
form and estimate the performance equation using an instru-
mental variable (IV) methodology.30
We rely on the proportion of the company’s other hotels
(across all brands) that are franchised in the same market in
any given month as our main instrument. This variable
reflects (to us) unobserved company costs of choosing a
particular organizational form locally and thus should influ-
ence the choice of organizational form for hotel i. Prior
research has shown that franchising tends to be used more
frequently in more rural or farther-away markets, or other
markets that are less familiar to a franchisor because of dif-
ferent demographics (such as presence of certain ethnic
groups), regulations (such as different tax laws across juris-
dictions), culture (such as need for a different language in
certain areas), and so on.31 Under such circumstances, fran-
chisees can help franchisors adjust better to the local mar-
ket. Our data on average distance to headquarters in table 3
support the contention that local franchisees are useful to a
franchisor in farther-away markets.32 Moreover, Kalnins
and Lafontaine (2004) show that franchisors cluster the out-
lets of their franchisees geographically. Similarly, and for
similar reasons according to their study, corporate outlets
tend to be clustered. Hence, the proportion of other fran-
chised hotels in a region should be highly correlated with
the organizational choice for a given hotel.
28 Since including the lag of price (occupancy rate) when the dependent
variable is occupancy rate (price) reduces the sample compared to when
we use RevPar, we reestimated the results for RevPar using the reduced
sample of 37,936 observations. The results were consistent with those
reported here.
29 For example, if the company ran a promotion for hotels in a certain
region, many of which turned out to be franchised, for several months
during our sample period, this could affect the performance of many fran-
chised hotels and thus bias the coefficient on the franchising dummy vari-
able upward. Indeed, this might explain why Ciliberto (2006) finds a sig-
nificant impact of organizational form changes on service provision and
investments in the hospital industry. In his study, the changes in organiza-
tional form were triggered by more fundamental changes in the market
for hospital services, in particular health care system reorganization.
These, however, should not only cause changes in organizational form
but should also affect performance directly.
30 Our goal is to correct for what is called the ‘‘endogenous dummy
variable’’ problem. As suggested in Heckman (1978, 1990) and Wool-
dridge (2002), we can estimate our performance equation by standard
2SLS (or IV) using a linear probability model for the first stage.
31 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a review of the empirical litera-
ture on the incidence of franchising.
32 See Cox and Mason (2007) for more discussion.
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We argue that this variable is a valid instrument because
it affects the decision to franchise a hotel locally, as
explained above, but also because it does not affect the per-
formance of a specific hotel directly. There are several rea-
sons for this. First, this variable does not affect a hotel’s
operating costs in the market. Second, on the demand side,
customers rarely are aware or mindful of whether a hotel is
corporate or franchised, so it is very unlikely that the extent
of franchising of local hotels, and specifically the extent of
franchising among the hotels of the company, will affect
demand at the focal hotel. Third, given that hotel ownership
does not enter customers’ preferences for rooms, there is no
reason for a manager at hotel i to react differently to the
competitive threat posed by franchised and corporate hotels
in his or her market. This again is especially true given that
the proportion of franchised hotels, as we measure it, is con-
structed across all the brands of the company in the market,
and we already control for market and hotel characteristics
that may affect hotel performance directly and for unob-
served hotel heterogeneity as well.33 Finally, Lafontaine
and Shaw (2005) discuss how franchisors target a stable
mix of franchised versus corporate outlets in the long run.34
While a target level of franchising is a corporate- or com-
pany-level decision affecting the likelihood that a given
hotel is franchised or not (given the proportion of other
hotels already franchised in the market), hotel prices and
performance are individual business unit outcomes and thus
depend on hotel-level decisions.
To control for both correlated and uncorrelated unobserved
hotel heterogeneity in our IV estimations, we again model
correlated heterogeneity as a function of hotel-level means
and address uncorrelated heterogeneity by correcting stan-
dard errors for hotel-level clusters.35
Once we endogenize the organizational form decision, in
table 5, we find that the effect of the franchising dummy
variable is not only economically small but that it becomes
statistically insignificant.36 The estimated coefficients for
other variables remain very similar to those we obtained















Number of rooms 0.268*** 0.003 0.268***
[0.069] [0.028] [0.041]
Hotel age 0.240*** 0.021*** 0.192***
[0.022] [0.008] [0.019]
Restaurant on site 0.084** 0.029 0.027
[0.035] [0.020] [0.021]
Air conditioning 0.104*** 0.059*** 0.014
[0.021] [0.012] [0.012]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.043* 0.017 0.011
[0.024] [0.015] [0.014]
Fitness facility 0.135*** 0.046 0.047*
[0.046] [0.033] [0.026]
Population 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.012***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.004]
Income 0.259*** 0.155*** 0.019
[0.032] [0.018] [0.020]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.051*** 0.017*** 0.026***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.009]
Tourism intensity ¼ 2 0.138*** 0.038*** 0.081***
[0.015] [0.004] [0.011]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.339*** 0.089*** 0.209***
[0.020] [0.006] [0.014]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.411*** 0.114*** 0.257***
[0.026] [0.009] [0.019]
Constant 0.265 0.347 3.053***
[0.361] [0.225] [0.231]
Brand fixed effects Yes** Yes** Yes**
Observations 39,226 37,936 37,936
Number of hotels (clusters) 1,194 1,194 1,194
This is an unbalanced sample; all specifications control for hotel unobserved correlated heterogeneity.
In all specifications, standard errors, in brackets, are corrected for heterostedasticity and hotel-level clus-
ters. Significant at: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. All specifications include dummy variables for 6 brands,
33 month-year dummy variables, 9 hotel competition, and 5 local restaurant competition intensity
dummy variables, as well as dummy variables for other hotel characteristics: presence of rental car coun-
ter, swimming pool, or conference room, and proximity to airport and to train station. For tourism inten-
sity, the lowest level (0) represents the omitted category. We control for hotel unobserved correlated het-
erogeneity by modeling it as a function of the hotel-level means of the following variables: number of
rooms, age, and tourism intensity dummy variables. In addition, when the dependent variable is price (or
occupancy rate), we include the mean of lagged occupancy rate (price).
33 In some cases of multi-outlet ownership (an issue we discuss in sec-
tion IVC), a single franchisee may own many hotels in a local market.
Thomadsen (2005) finds evidence that such franchisees may be able to
price higher due to their local market power. However, our instrument
represents the average proportion of franchised outlets across all the
chains and brands of the company in the market, and as such, it is differ-
ent from, and unlikely to be affected by, the number of outlets of any
multi-outlet owner. Moreover, we already control for the potential market
power of a franchisee that could also affect hotel performance using our
controls for correlated unobserved hotel heterogeneity (i.e. ‘‘hotel fixed
effects’’).
34 For example, Accor North America, one of the largest hotel compa-
nies, recently announced the opening of 57 new hotels in North America,
including 51 franchised and 6 corporate properties. According to Olivier
Poirot, the CEO, ‘‘Our growth plans in North America are consistent with
Accor’s philosophy to maintain balance as an owner/operator, manage-
ment partner and franchisor. . . . By increasing the growth of both fran-
chised and corporately-owned locations in our network, Accor is getting
closer to achieving our goal of reaching 1,200 North American properties
by 2010’’ (HNN Hotelnewsnow.com. 2009a).
35 The clustering also helps avoid potential underestimation of standard
errors that can result from the repetition of time-invariant variables within
hotel. See Moulton (1990) for more details.
36 Table A1 (see appendix) shows first-stage regression results for all
three dependent variables. In these regressions, the instrument always has
a positive and significant, at 1%, effect, on the probability that a hotel is
franchised, as expected. At the means, the probability of an outlet being
franchised increases by 9% for a one standard deviation increase (0.27) in
the proportion of other hotels of the company that are franchised in the
local market. The first-stage F-statistic, at around 34 in all regressions, is
much larger than the critical value of 10 needed to satisfy the weak instru-
ment test suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997), a test that Stock and
Yogo (2002) further confirm provides a safe threshold especially in the
case of one endogenous variable and one (or two) instrument(s), as we
have here. In his discussion of robust tools of inference, Stock (2010)
further emphasizes this test and points out that ‘‘then one can treat the
instruments as sufficiently strong.’’ Murray (2006), moreover, points out
that when instruments are weak, the estimated standard errors in 2SLS are
too small and thus null hypotheses are too often rejected. However, when
the Stock and Yogo (2002) test rejects the null hypothesis of weak IV,
inferences based on 2SLS estimates and standard errors should be valid.
Murray suggests a rule-of-thumb to verify that 2SLS estimates are more
reliable than OLS estimates in small samples. He proposes that the num-
ber of observations multiplied by the R2 from the first stage (0.43 in our
case; see table A1) should be larger than the number of instruments. This
condition is clearly satisfied here, even if we use the number of hotels
(clusters) instead of the number of observations in such calculations.
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under OLS and RE estimation in table 4. We conclude that
the positive difference in prices for franchised hotels, for
example, found in our descriptive statistics, which had
become small but negative after we addressed omitted vari-
able bias using controls for hotel and market characteristics,
observed and unobserved, in table 4, is statistically as well
as economically insignificant when we endogenize organi-
zational form. In other words, the small differences between
franchised and corporate hotels we found in table 4 were
not due to franchising per se, but rather reflected remaining
endogeneity bias likely due to correlation between unob-
served time-varying market or hotel variables and organiza-
tional form choice.
We view our results as evidence that in contexts where
firms are free to choose to organize their transactions as
they see fit, based on observed and unobserved (by the
econometrician) market and firm characteristics, they are
able to achieve similar outcomes in terms of prices and per-
formance across all their outlets.37 This is perhaps to be
expected when a firm that would find, for example, that
prices in any of its franchised outlets were higher than it
would like, or revenues lower than what it can achieve in
corporate hotels, could remedy this situation by choosing to
buy back the property and operate the hotel corporately
instead. Indeed, in the hotel industry, franchise companies
can (and do) terminate franchise contract during the con-
tract period if the franchisee underperforms relative to the
company’s expectations—for example, when the franchisee
is not bringing in sufficient levels of revenue.38 The fact
that we see very few changes in organizational form during
the almost three years of our data suggests that the company
is rather satisfied with the results it obtains under its current
set of organizational choices.39
In what follows, we verify the robustness of our results
across several alternative specifications, starting with poten-
tial nonlinear effects of organizational form.
B. Testing for Nonlinear Effects of Organizational Form
So far we have looked for performance differences that
would take the form of intercept shifts. In this section, we
consider the possibility that performance differences be-
tween franchised and corporate hotels might depend on
other variables as well. We focus on hotel age and size
(number of rooms) because our data in table 3 suggest that
franchised and corporate hotels are different along these
dimensions in particular.40 From a theoretical perspective,
performance differences between franchised and corporate
hotels might increase with hotel age as the franchisee
becomes more experienced. In fact, franchisors often high-
light the franchisee’s long-term involvement in the business
as a main benefit of franchising when compared to the typi-
cally much shorter tenure of company managers at any
given property. If franchising leads to more stable manage-
ment at the hotel and such stability is beneficial, then the
performance difference between franchised and corporate
hotels would increase with hotel age. Performance differ-
ences between franchised and corporate hotels may also
increase or decrease with hotel size. In particular, agency
theory suggests that franchisees, as local owners, should be
better at overseeing and managing staff, a task that is ex-
pected to be more problematic in larger hotels. The empiri-
cal literature, however, suggests that franchising is used
more for smaller rather than larger outlets.41 As table 3
shows, our data also follow this pattern: on average, fran-
chised hotels are significantly smaller (by about 25 rooms)
than corporate hotels. They also tend to be younger (about
five years).
To see how performance differences relate to hotel age
and size, we include cross-effects between the franchising
dummy variable and hotel age and size, respectively, in our
performance equations. Since organizational form is an
endogenous variable, the cross-effects are also endogenous,
so we include only one cross-effect at a time and rely on
two instruments: our previous instrument (the proportion of
the company’s other hotels in the market that are fran-
chised) and its cross-effect with age or size. Though not
shown, the instruments were jointly significant at 1% in all
first-stage regressions.42 The results from our second-stage
regressions, in table 6, show that neither the franchising
dummy nor its cross-terms has a significant effect. In other
words, we find no evidence that the impact of organiza-
tional form on performance or prices varies with hotel size
or age or that controlling for such cross-effects alters our
37 Shaver (1998) also finds that once endogenized, organizational
form—in his case, the mode of entry choice between greenfield versus ac-
quisition—has no effect on the survival of subsidiaries.
38 For more details on early termination of franchise contract, see Hotel
& Motel Management (2008), HNN Hotelnewsnow.com. (2009b), and
http://business-law.freeadvice.com/franchise_law/agreement_terminated
.htm).
39 Though one might think that the company instead could tailor the
franchise contract to the characteristics of the hotel or the market, in rea-
lity these firms set the terms of their franchise contracts at the brand level
and do not tailor to specific hotels. In fact, as Lafontaine and Slade (2007)
noted, the empirical literature has shown that it is the extent to which
firms rely on franchising or not, rather than the terms of franchise con-
tracts, that is more responsive to differences in firm and market character-
istics.
40 We also experimented with cross-effects between the franchise dummy
and population or income to see whether responses to organizational form
may vary with demographic characteristics of the market. However, corpo-
rate and franchised hotels are found in markets with very similar population
and income levels (see table 3). Since we have no time variation in our
demographic data, the correlations between the franchise dummy and its
cross-effect with log(population) and log(income) were 0.98 and 0.99,
respectively. Consequently, we could not reliably identify separate effects
for these.
41 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
42 The F-statistics in all first-stage regressions were also much larger
than the critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002, table 1) for
the case of two endogenous variables and four instruments (F ¼ 11.04).
Though the critical values for our case (two endogenous variables and
two instruments) are not tabulated, the critical values increase with the
number of instruments so we can infer that our results pass their test.
First-stage results are available on request.
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previous results of no performance differences between the
two organizational forms.43
C. Other Robustness Analyses
Balanced sample. Though we have observations for 34
months for most of the hotels in our sample, there are 122
hotels for which the time series are incomplete, and in some
cases the number of observations is as small as three.44 To
verify that the presence of hotels with such short time series
does not affect our results, we replicated tables 4 and 5 for
the subsample of 1,072 hotels with full time-series data.
The results, in appendix tables A2 and A3, confirm that our
conclusions are not affected by the presence or absence of
these few hotels.
Brand subsamples. All our regressions include brand
dummy variables to control for differences between brands.
However, given the variation in table 2, one might wonder
whether performance differences due to organizational
form and the effect of other variables might differ across
brands. To address this issue, we replicated our IV estima-
tions for all three dependent variables separately for each of
the five brand groups in table 2. Though not shown, the
results once again support our conclusion of no significant
performance or price differences between franchised and
corporate hotels. We also found the impact of other vari-
ables in these regressions to be quite consistent with those
in table 5. In other words, the pooling of data across brands
does not drive any of our results.
Total hotel revenues per month as a dependent
variable. As discussed earlier, RevPar is a standard mea-
sure used to assess hotel performance in the industry. How-
TABLE 6—TESTING FOR NONLINEAR IMPACTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Dependent Variable log(RevPar) log(Price) log(Occupancy Rate)
Franchised 0.027 0.956 0.060 0.974 0.054 0.373
[0.176] [1.260] [0.106] [0.860] [0.123] [0.700]
Franchised  Age 0.050 0.013 0.01
[0.078] [0.047] [0.052]
Franchised  Size 0.242 0.219 0.069
[0.293] [0.202] [0.162]
Lagged occupancy 0.044*** 0.044***
[0.005] [0.006]
Lagged price 0.218*** 0.217***
[0.022] [0.022]
Number of rooms (hotel size) 0.259*** 0.078 0.005 0.186 0.266*** 0.326**
[0.070] [0.239] [0.029] [0.171] [0.042] [0.142]
Hotel age 0.278*** 0.243*** 0.011 0.018** 0.199*** 0.191***
[0.064] [0.023] [0.037] [0.009] [0.045] [0.020]
Restaurant on site 0.089** 0.079** 0.030 0.024 0.028 0.028
[0.038] [0.037] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Air conditioning 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.060*** 0.067*** 0.014 0.011
[0.022] [0.024] [0.013] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.045* 0.047* 0.018 0.021 0.011 0.01
[0.024] [0.025] [0.015] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014]
Fitness facility 0.146*** 0.125** 0.048 0.037 0.049* 0.050*
[0.048] [0.050] [0.035] [0.037] [0.028] [0.027]
Population 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.012***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Income 0.254*** 0.257*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.018 0.019
[0.033] [0.033] [0.019] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.026***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.003] [0.003] [0.009] [0.009]
Tourism intensity ¼ 2 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.081***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.004] [0.004] [0.011] [0.011]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.339*** 0.339*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.209*** 0.209***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.006] [0.006] [0.014] [0.014]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.257*** 0.257***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.009] [0.009] [0.019] [0.019]
Constant 0.249 0.051 0.336 0.087 3.051*** 3.143***
[0.364] [0.547] [0.223] [0.322] [0.231] [0.308]
Brand fixed effects Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes** Yes**
Observations 39,226 39,226 37,936 37,936 37,936 37,936
Number of hotels (clusters) 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
See the notes for table 5.
43 When we include the cross-effects with size (columns 2, 4, 6), the
coefficient of the franchising dummy becomes noticeably larger, which,
given the strong statistical properties of our instruments, is likely due to
the high correlation between the franchising dummy and its cross-effect
with size rather than to weak instruments.
44 Among these, 91 hotels enter after the start of our sample period and
13 hotels drop out before the end. Thus, exit is very rare in our data. In
fact, given that the hotels in question all disappear from our data less than
one year before the end of our sample, they could represent simply miss-
ing data (due to delays in reporting to company headquarters) rather than
exits. Given that the life cycle of a hotel is quite long (due to the large
investment involved), hotel exits/closures are generally rare (see Freed-
man & Kosova´, 2012, on this).
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ever, for completeness, we also reestimated our performance
equation using hotel monthly revenues as the outcome mea-
sure. The results (not shown) confirmed our findings in that
franchised hotels on average did not show significantly dif-
ferent monthly revenues compared to corporate hotels.
Controlling for multi-outlet ownership. Some studies in
the franchising literature examine how multiple-outlet own-
ership by franchisees can alter the effect of franchising on
performance (Brickley, 1999; Kalnins & Lafontaine, 2004;
Thomadsen, 2005). They suggest that franchisees with a
higher number of franchised outlets may not be able to moni-
tor manager behavior in their outlets any better than the fran-
chisor can. This could lead to worse outcomes for franchised
outlets and bias downward our estimates of differences
between franchised and corporate hotels. Alternatively, fran-
chisees with numerous outlets may be able to exercise some
market power, biasing the effect of franchising upward in
our performance regressions. Though correcting for hotel
unobserved heterogeneity generally addresses these issues,
we also reestimated all regressions controlling for multi-
outlet ownership as captured by the number of other hotels
of the company that a franchisee owns (calculated across all
the company’s brands).45 These analyses again confirmed
our findings: across all the specifications for both balanced
and unbalanced data, we found that multi-outlet ownership
had no significant impact on performance, so its absence in
our main specifications did not bias our results.
Using alternative instruments for organizational
form. To further verify the robustness of our IV results,
we explored alternative measures of the company’s costs of
using different organizational forms as instruments: the (log
of the) total number of hotels of the company in the market,
franchised or not (Hotel Density) and the log distance of the
hotel to company headquarters.46 If, for example, the com-
pany’s monitoring costs are lower in markets where the firm
already operates many other hotels, perhaps because it is
less costly to obtain relevant information in such markets,
then it should be less problematic to operate more of its
hotels corporately in such markets.47 In addition, agency
theory suggests that greater distance to company headquar-
ters should increase the need for franchising, because the
costs of monitoring farther-away outlets are greater, and
franchisees are expected to outperform company operations
in more distant markets since they know the local market
better and can thus better respond to customer needs.48 We
believe that both of these variables can be excluded from
our performance equation because we already control for
market and hotel characteristics that may affect perfor-
mance directly via our numerous control variables, includ-
ing brand, competition, and monthly dummy variables, and
we control for unobserved hotel heterogeneity.49
Since both instruments rely primarily on cross-market (as
opposed to between- or within-hotel) variation, we include
them together in our first-stage regressions. We find that
both are significant in all first-stage regressions (results
available on request). The second-stage results, summarized
in appendix table A4, again confirm our previous findings:
once we endogenize organizational form, we find no signifi-
cant differences in pricing or performance between fran-
chised and corporate hotels.50
Quantile regressions. We explore further the impact of
organizational form on performance using quantile regres-
sions. Unlike OLS or IV estimation, both of which focus on
predicting means, quantile regressions rely on minimizing
absolute deviations and enable us to identify differences in
outcomes between franchised and corporate hotels at differ-
ent parts of the distribution. This type of analysis is of interest
not only as an additional robustness check for our previous
mean-focused analyses, since quantile regressions are less
susceptible to outliers, but also because risk or uncertainty,
and thus higher or lower variation in outcomes, may give rise
to different responses to organizational form. In particular,
the data in table 3 suggest that while corporate hotels experi-
ence higher variation in prices and RevPar, there is slightly
higher variation in occupancy rates across franchised hotels.
We estimate our baseline specification (controlling for
hotel correlated unobserved heterogeneity but treating
franchising as exogenous) for three quantiles: 25th, 50th
(median), and 75th percentile.51 In these regressions, the
45 Recall that we observe ownership only at the end of our data period,
so this variable is constant over time for a given franchisee and all their
hotels. We can nonetheless include this variable in our regressions when
we control for unobserved correlated hotel heterogeneity using Mundlak’s
(1978) approach.
46 Note that this count is for the entire sample period. When we used the
number of the company’s hotels per month instead, the results were very
similar.
47 Alternatively, the firm might experiment in new markets with corpo-
rate hotels and then sell the established hotels to franchisees. In this case,
we should find a positive correlation between the number of hotels of the
company in the market and franchising. Whether the number of company
hotels in the end increases or decreases the likelihood of franchising, there
are theoretical arguments to support using this variable as an instrument
for organizational form.
48 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a survey of evidence on fran-
chising showing that more geographically dispersed franchised chains
tend to use franchising more. Also, see Kalnins and Lafontaine (2013) for
evidence that distance from monitoring headquarters reduces the survival
of business outlets. One way to counter this effect is to franchise farther-
away outlets, thereby effectively reducing the distance between owner
headquarter and the outlet.
49 Note that the company’s headquarters is located in a large city that is
a major tourist destination. Thus, one may argue that hotels near head-
quarters might have better outcomes on average for this reason. However,
we control for tourism intensity directly via our tourism intensity dum-
mies, as well as via our controls for hotel unobserved heterogeneity.
50 When we used hotel density and distance to headquarters separately
as instruments, our main conclusions did not change, but the estimated
coefficients of the franchising dummy variable were noisier.
51 As Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) mentioned, practical estimation
and inference methods for instrumental quantile regressions are complex
and still being explored. At the same time, treating the franchising
dummy variable as exogenous ensures that results from our quantile re-
gressions are not driven by the choice of instruments.
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coefficients of the franchising dummy variable do not
reflect the average or mean differences between franchised
and corporate hotels in our outcome measures, but differ-
ences in medians, 25th, and 75th percentiles between the
two groups of hotels. Also, to account for possible cross-
correlations in standard errors across quantiles and thus
obtain more robust results, we estimate the impacts on all
three quantiles simultaneously and use bootstrap resampling
to obtain the variance-covariance matrix.52 We use 100
replications for occupancy and price but, due to conver-
gence problems, only 50 replications for RevPar.
Results, shown in table 7, again support our earlier con-
clusions: the differences in performance and pricing attribu-
table to franchising as organizational form are either statis-
tically insignificant or, in the few cases of statistical
significance, the effects are economically very small—even
smaller than those we found in our OLS estimations (table
4). Specifically, for prices, we find that the coefficient of
the franchising dummy variable is significant only for the
75th percentile regression, and the size of this coefficient
implies that the price of a franchised hotel at the 75th per-
centile is 0.7% lower than the price of a corporate hotel at
the 75th percentile. This represents a difference of only
0.49 euros (at 70.14 euros for the 75th percentile in our
sample). Meanwhile, OLS estimates suggested about a 2%
difference (or 1.07 euros) at the mean (53.67).
At the same time, as in our OLS estimations, we find that
whether a hotel has a fitness facility or faces high tourism
intensity, for example, generates a 9% (more than ten times
larger) positive difference in prices. In other words, the pre-







q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75 q25 q50 q75
Franchised 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.003 0.003 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.005 0.004*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Lagged occupancy 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.040***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Lagged price 0.234*** 0.178*** 0.146***
[0.019] [0.017] [0.014]
Number of rooms 0.303*** 0.322*** 0.227*** 0.021 0.011 0.034 0.222*** 0.285*** 0.220***
[0.096] [0.065] [0.054] [0.026] [0.028] [0.025] [0.058] [0.037] [0.032]
Hotel age 0.262*** 0.172*** 0.122*** 0.004 0.021** 0.022** 0.190*** 0.124*** 0.087***
[0.024] [0.027] [0.023] [0.009] [0.011] [0.010] [0.021] [0.016] [0.013]
Restaurant on site 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.108*** 0.018*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.007 0.017*** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Air conditioning 0.120*** 0.101*** 0.075*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.010** 0.006* 0.004*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.002]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.030*** 0.042*** 0.064*** 0.006** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.010*** 0.012***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Fitness facility 0.131*** 0.118*** 0.152*** 0.010 0.052*** 0.090*** 0.059*** 0.051*** 0.024***
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006]
Population 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Income 0.278*** 0.217*** 0.190*** 0.096*** 0.106*** 0.120*** 0.049*** 0.002 0.032***
[0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.028*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.019***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004]
Tourism Intensity ¼ 2 0.111*** 0.116*** 0.096*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.081*** 0.070*** 0.046***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.290*** 0.281*** 0.240*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.206*** 0.170*** 0.113***
[0.013] [0.009] [0.010] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] [0.007]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.373*** 0.323*** 0.251*** 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.258*** 0.204*** 0.127***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.013] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007]
Constant 0.272*** 0.500*** 0.962*** 0.891*** 0.918*** 0.904*** 2.346*** 3.169*** 3.702***
[0.100] [0.088] [0.079] [0.047] [0.045] [0.048] [0.069] [0.056] [0.046]
Brand FE Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 39,226 39,226 39,226 37,936 37,936 37,936 37,936 37,936 37,936
Number of hotels 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Bootst rapped replications 50a 50a 50y 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo–R2 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.78 0.79 0.77 0.30 0.28 0.25
This is an unbalanced sample; all specifications control for hotel unobserved correlated heterogeneity. Bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. All specifications include
dummy variables for 6 brands, 33 month-year dummy variables, 9 hotel competition, and 5 local restaurant competition intensity dummy variables, as well as dummy variables for other hotel characteristics: presence
of rental car counter, swimming pool, or conference room, and proximity to airport and to train station. For tourism intensity, the lowest level (0) represents the omitted category. All specifications control for hotel
unobserved correlated heterogeneity by modeling it as a function of the hotel level means of the following variables: number of rooms, age, and tourism intensity dummy variables. In addition, when the dependent
variable is price (or occupancy rate), we include the mean of lagged occupancy rate (price).
a Higher numbers of replications (we tried 100 and 200) led to convergence problems.
52 Given the panel nature of our data, it can easily happen that the out-
come values for the same hotel would cross boundaries of different quan-
tiles in different months.
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sence of a fitness room in a franchised hotel at the 75th per-
centile of the price distribution more than outweighs any
price difference attributable to franchising as organizational
form. For occupancy rates, the most sensitive to franchising
seems to be the 25th percentile. But even among these low-
occupation hotels, franchised hotels show only about 1%
lower occupancy rates than corporate hotels relative to an
occupancy rate of 60.6% for the 25th percentile in our sam-
ple. Finally, RevPar seems most sensitive to organizational
form, but the standard errors for this outcome might be
underestimated as we were unable to complete more than
50 bootstrap replications.53 Nonetheless, assuming that the
estimated coefficients would remain significant with more
replications, they would imply negative differences for
franchised hotels of between 1% and 3% for RevPar for the
three quantiles. This again is a slightly smaller impact than
the mean difference, of about 4%, suggested by our OLS
results and much smaller impacts on performance once
again when compared to that of other hotel or market char-
acteristics.
Finally, comparing the magnitudes of the estimates
across quantiles for each outcome suggests that responses
to organizational form are relatively similar across different
parts of the outcome distributions. This suggests that our
previous mean-focused estimations, in particular, our IV
results where we can fully endogenize organizational form,
should yield robust and reliable conclusions regarding the
impact of franchising versus corporate ownership on perfor-
mance.
V. Conclusion
Using proprietary monthly panel data from a large multi-
chain hotel company, we examine the impact of organiza-
tional form, franchised versus corporate, on hotel-level out-
comes: RevPar, Occupancy Rates, and Price. In the raw
data, we find significant differences—higher prices and
lower occupancy rates among franchised than among cor-
porate hotels. Once we control for hotel and market charac-
teristics and for self-selection bias due to hotel unobserved
correlated heterogeneity, we find lower rather than higher
prices and lower revenues per available room (RevPar), but
similar occupancy rates, in franchised compared to corpo-
rate hotels. In addition, the differences in prices and RevPar
become very small relative to those associated with hotel
characteristics such as the presence of air conditioning or a
fitness facility, or those due to market characteristics such
as tourism intensity. These results are further supported by
our quantile regressions, which showed that even when
examining other parts of the outcome distributions rather
than the means, the performance differences between fran-
chised and corporate hotels are either insignificant or even
smaller than those suggested by OLS estimates.
Finally, we find that the differences in outcomes between
franchised and corporate hotels all become statistically
insignificant once we endogenize the choice of organiza-
tional form in our performance equations. Empirical ana-
lyses of the effect of organizational form on performance
have suffered from a lack of good instruments in general.
Because our data are comprehensive when it comes to the
company’s operations, however, we have access to informa-
tion on its governance decisions for other hotels in the same
markets. We show that this variable is a valid instrument in
our context and hope that this will encourage other authors
to look for similar types of instruments in future analyses of
the effects of governance.
Our finding, that there are no performance or price differ-
ences between hotels operated under the two modes of
organization once such decisions are endogenized, is robust
across various specifications. We also find no evidence that
outcome differences between the two organizational forms
change with hotel size or age in regressions, including
cross-effects between our franchise dummy variable and
hotel age or size. We conclude that the company optimally
chooses which outlets to franchise and own such that, con-
ditional on market and hotel characteristics, and accounting
for incentive and local knowledge utilization differences, it
achieves consistent results in terms of outcomes it cares
about, namely RevPar, occupancy rates, and prices, across
both sets of hotels.
Overall, though our evidence is limited by the reliance
on a single company’s data, we view our results as suppor-
tive of the idea that when firm governance is not con-
strained, organizational form decisions in large, mature
multinational firms such as our company should be made
optimally. In fact, we expect that if the company could sys-
tematically obtain larger revenues per room or higher occu-
pancy rates or better prices, from its perspective, by modi-
fying the organizational form under which some of its
hotels operate, it would simply do so. However, if different
organizational forms coexist because the option to organize
transactions in different ways helps firms circumvent var-
ious agency or market obstacles, as the literature on the
choice of organizational form emphasizes, we should not be
surprised to find that after controlling for factors that affect
this decision, organizational form itself does not give rise to
different outcomes. These outcomes simply will be achieved
in different ways. Where we might expect to see differences,
then, is in intermediate decisions and strategies (such as
amount of labor or compensation practices) implemented
differently across organizational forms (see Krueger, 1991;
Freedman & Kosova´, forthcoming) to achieve the same
desired outcome in the end.
Results on the effect of organizational form on firm per-
formance in the literature have mostly been obtained in set-
tings where firms have been constrained either by policy or
53 Though twenty replications should be generally sufficient for hypoth-
esis testing (as noted in STATA’s statistical manual, v.11), raising the
number of bootstrap replications from 50 to 100 for price and occupancy
rate led to slightly higher standard errors for the franchised dummy vari-
able, suggesting some underestimation bias with smaller numbers of
replications.
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by other features of their environment, (such as unions), to
rely on specific organizational forms they might not have
chosen otherwise. This literature has found that firms per-
form less well under these circumstances. Our results, on
the other hand, were obtained in an unconstrained setting.
Thus, in a broad sense, comparing our results to those in the
literature, we can conclude that policies and features of the
environment that constrain firm choices of organizational
form indeed can affect firm performance in important ways.
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TABLE APPENDIX
TABLE A1—FIRST-STAGE RESULTS FOR FRANCHISE DUMMY (IN TABLE 5), UNBALANCED SAMPLE
Second-Stage Dependent Variable log(RevPar) log(Price) log(Occupancy Rate)
IV: Proportion of company’s other







Number of rooms 0.005 0.006 0.006
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Hotel age 0.016 0.014 0.020
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
Restaurant on site 0.218*** 0.220*** 0.226***
[0.043] [0.042] [0.042]
Air conditioning 0.097*** 0.098*** 0.110***
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.005 0.003 0.000
[0.038] [0.038] [0.037]
Fitness facility 0.181*** 0.173*** 0.168***
[0.058] [0.059] [0.058]
Population 0.003 0.002 0.001
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Income 0.029 0.019 0.008
[0.054] [0.054] [0.056]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Tourism intensity ¼ 2 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.000 0.001 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.002 0.001 0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Constant 1.922*** 2.213*** 2.205***
[0.515] [0.565] [0.530]
Brand fixed effects Yes*** Yes*** Yes***
Observations 39,226 37,936 37,936
Number of hotels 1,194 1,194 1,194
F-statistics on significance of IV 33.98*** 33.60*** 34.69***
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.43 0.43
First-stage regressions show the results from the linear probability model estimated by standard 2SLS procedure (we report the second-stage results for the performance equation in table 5). Standard errors, in
brackets, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and hotel-level clusters. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%.
All 1st-stage regressions include the other variables included (but unreported) in the second-stage regressions, namely: dummy variables for 6 brands, 33 month-year dummy variables, 9 hotel competition and 5
local restaurant competition intensity dummy variables, as well as dummy variables for other hotel characteristics: presence of rental car counter, swimming pool, or conference room, and proximity to airport and to
train station. For tourism intensity, the lowest level (0) represents the omitted category. In addition, we control for hotel unobserved correlated heterogeneity by modeling it as a function of the hotel level means of
the same variables we use in the second stages: number of rooms, age, and tourism intensity dummy variables. Also, when the dependent variable in the second stage is price (or occupancy rate), we include the mean
of lagged occupancy rate (price).
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Number of rooms 0.327*** 0.014 0.288***
[0.050] [0.033] [0.038]
Hotel age 0.132*** 0.007 0.089***
[0.023] [0.012] [0.022]
Restaurant on site 0.076** 0.019 0.028
[0.039] [0.021] [0.022]
Air conditioning 0.124*** 0.053*** 0.026**
[0.023] [0.014] [0.013]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.033 0.018 0.004
[0.024] [0.016] [0.014]
Fitness facility 0.120** 0.044 0.040
[0.049] [0.037] [0.027]
Population 0.040*** 0.018*** 0.008**
[0.008] [0.005] [0.004]
Income 0.267*** 0.152*** 0.020
[0.033] [0.019] [0.021]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.045*** 0.014*** 0.023**
[0.011] [0.003] [0.009]
Tourism intensity ¼ 2 0.121*** 0.033*** 0.072***
[0.014] [0.004] [0.011]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.316*** 0.085*** 0.196***
[0.019] [0.006] [0.015]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.368*** 0.101*** 0.235***
[0.024] [0.007] [0.019]
Constant 0.110 0.111 3.032***
[0.364] [0.238] [0.237]
Brand fixed effects Yes** Yes** Yes**
Observations 36,448 35,376 35,376
Number of hotels 1,072 1,072 1,072
This is a balanced sample: All specifications control for hotel unobserved correlated heterogeneity.
See the notes to table 5.
TABLE A4—IV ESTIMATIONS WITH ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS FOR FRANCHISE















Number of rooms 0.263*** 0.007 0.267***
[0.070] [0.028] [0.041]
Hotel age 0.248*** 0.016 0.194***
[0.024] [0.010] [0.020]
Restaurant on site 0.019 0.050 0.001
[0.099] [0.070] [0.046]
Air conditioning 0.059 0.025 0.001
[0.049] [0.034] [0.024]
Outdoor cafe´ 0.036 0.011 0.009
[0.029] [0.023] [0.014]
Fitness facility 0.219** 0.105 0.066*
[0.093] [0.065] [0.039]
Population 0.041*** 0.014** 0.011**
[0.010] [0.007] [0.005]
Income 0.273*** 0.162*** 0.018
[0.043] [0.028] [0.021]
Tourism intensity ¼ 1 0.051*** 0.017*** 0.026***
[0.011] [0.003] [0.009]
Tourism intensity ¼ 2 0.137*** 0.038*** 0.080***
[0.015] [0.004] [0.011]
Tourism intensity ¼ 3 0.339*** 0.089*** 0.208***
[0.020] [0.006] [0.014]
Tourism intensity ¼ 4 0.412*** 0.113*** 0.257***
[0.027] [0.009] [0.019]
Constant 0.587 0.406 2.818***
[0.884] [0.672] [0.452]
Brand fixed effects Yes** Yes** Yes**
Observations 39,226 37,936 37,936
Number of hotels 1,194 1,194 1,194
This is an unbalanced sample. All specifications control for hotel unobserved correlated heterogeneity.
Both instruments are in logs. For other notes, see table 5.
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